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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ABC Code letters used to avoid identifying a location or navigation facility
AIM Airman's Information Manual
ARTCC Air route traffic control center
ASRS (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATC Air traffic control
ATIS Automated terminal information service
FL Flight level (standard altitude in hundreds of feet)
F/0 First officer or copilot
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
IFR Instrument flight rules
IMC Instrument meteorological conditions
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
U.S. United States
VHF Very high frequency (radio communications unit)
XY-X Code letters useu to avoid identifying a location or navigation facility
XYZ Code letters used to avoid identifying a location or navigation facility
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ADDRESSEE ERRORS IN ATC COMMUNICATIONS:
THE CALL ST_:N PROBLEM
by
Captain William P. Monan*
INTRODUCTION t
The typical reaction of any airman or controller to the subject of ATC
radio communications probably parallels the typical reaction of a housewife
to the subject of the kitchen sink. Both items represent important job func-
tions -- must-do activities -- but the tasks involved are too commonplace,
mundane, and repetitive to be intellectually challenging or capable of arous-
ing emotional enthusiasm. Yet, the routine of controller-cockpit-controller
message exchange is one of the most -- if not the most -- important factors
in navigating an aircraft safely through the airspace and the ATC structure.
Furthermore, as the Airman's Information Manual states, "The link (between
airman and controller) can be broken with surprising speed and with disas-
trous results"**.
During the past 4-year period, more than 2,000 reports describing poten-
tially serious aviation incidents involving faulty pilot-ATC communications
have been voluntarily submitted to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS). Within this melange of misunderstood messages, problems with air-
craft call signs appeared as major factors. Abbreviated aircraft identif-
iers, smeared or partially blocked call signs, transposed trip numbers, human
factors such as hearing "what you expect to hear" conditioning, misunderstood
call ups and a tangled confusion of similar sounding aircraft call signs --
these front-end deficiencies in radio message transmissions contributed sig-
nificant numbers of hazardous occurrences in airline, corporate, air taxi,
military, and General Aviation operations. They were reported causal agents
* Previously regional director of flight operations for an international air-
line, Captain Monan serves as an Aviation Safety Research Consultant to
Battelle's Columbus Laboratories ASRS Office. 	 i
	
rr
**airman's Information Manual (AIM), Section 190.
I
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for unauthorized climbs/descents, simultaneous takeoffs from intersecting
runways, aborts, go-arounds, wrong-way headings, runway incursions, missed
crossing restrictions and near collisions, both on the ground and in flight.
In view of this impact upon the aviation system, it is timely to make a
critical examination and analysis of the reports depicting the more frequent
types of breakdowns in the call up/acknowledgement part of the communication
exchange.
APPROACH
From June 1978 through May 1982, 2025 reports involving faulty ATC/pilot
communications were submitted to ASRS. Detailed screening of these reports
identified 462 occurrences associated with call sign message deficiencies or
misperceptions.
Analysis of this data set revealed three characteristic event sequences
in the flawed call up/acknowledgement exchanges: controller transmission of a
wrong aircraft call sign in the call up message, airman acknowledgement and
compliance with a clearance issued to another aircraft, and call up message
failures in which an airman neither heard nor acknowledged ATC instructions.
Two of the three event sequences represented double failures in
controller/cockpit/controller dialogues.
	 Airmen's acknowledgements for
clearances	 intended for other aircraft and airmen failures
	 to
hear/acknowledge ATC instructions developed into reportable incidents only
when controllers failed to notice the pilots' errors or omissions. The
prevalence of this sequence -- an airman communication error followed by a
controller's miss of readback/acknowledgement -- mandated review of communi-
cation procedures and responsibilities as currently listed in the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR), the AIM, and the Air Traffic Contrail Handbook*.
The causal factors pertinent to all of these call sign communication
problems consisted primarily of human performance inadequacies and limita-
* FAA Air Traffic Control Handbook, 7110.65.
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tions. However, these behavioral patterns never operated independently from
system constraints and complexities; heavy congestion on the frequency, con-
troller workload in traffic management, and operational priorities in the
cockpit produced very demanding conditions and distracting influences that
predisposed the errors in the communication exchanges.
The analysis of the data set resulted in identifying five categories of
call sign related errors committed by airmen and controllers singly and in
combination. The mechanisms of these errors and the factors predisposing
them are covered in the following "Discussion" section of this report.
Two characteristics of the ASRS reporting system are significant to this
call sign study. All aircraft designators have been deidentified: letters
or numbers (e.g., "ABC", 11XV 11 , "123") have been substituted for manufacturer
or corporate nametags and/or aircraft flight/registration identifiers. Addi-
tionally, the ASRS is a voluntary system hence reporter observations must be
regarded as unverified statements of individual, subjective viewpoints, and
opinions.
DISCUSSION
Faulty Radio Techniques; or., "Mumble,
Mumble, --- on Down Wind"
Faulty radio techniques include both mechanical misuse of microphone or
speakers and incorrect or inappropriate phraseology. Two types of each tech-
nique fault category appeared in the report data set:
• Microphone usage
• Dangling phraseology
• Cockpit speaker usage
• The deliberately over-abbreviated call sign
3
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Microphone usage. - The AIM*
 states: "Listen before you transmit....
after pressing the mike button a slight pause may be necessary to make sure
the first word is transmitted". However, the ASRS evidently does not serve
as a normal reporting channel for personal learning experiences in basic
radio communication Techniques. Only two airmen submitted comments concern-
ing "mike mumblings" but !roth indicated that the self-smeared call sign prob-
lem was being encountered "all too often" at small, Unicom fields. "I
believe," theorized a General Aviation reporter, "that the midair collision
problem at uncontrolled airports may be related to the pilot transmissions of
position reports". As one recommendation, he suggested that airmen preface
their in-the-blind transmissions with the name of the airport being used.
"However," he stated, "the word 'at' should be inserted as the first word in
the message to give time for the mike button to be fully depressed".
A commuter pilot's experiences at uncontrolled airports elicited paral-
lel observations:
"...all too often, the pilot starts talking about the
same time that he depresses his transmit button. The
call comes out, 'mumble, mumble, on downwind', or, 'mum-
ble, mumble, on left base'.
"All you know from such messages is that someone is some-
where in the area and you had better start looking hard
in all directions."
Four other reports suggested faulty mike techniques by ATC controllers.
One of these narratives surmised that an out-of-synch pressing of a foot-
pedal-operated microphone was slurring controller call ups.
"The controller said, 'Mnffm, unh, right one six zero'.
I replied, 'What?', whereupon he said, 'Do a right three
sixty and don't argue'!"
Dangling phraseology. - A less obvious flaw in communication technique,
noted in both pilot and controller reports, was the practice of what might be
called "the delayed dangling phrase". This was the add-on of an explanatory
phrase or sentence to a transmission that sounded, tonally and in contents,
*AIM , Chapter 191.
4
err
,E
0
yw+k,	 .g,, .. ,	 .; ..^•f = s .	 , . ;^	 •,	 ^ n	 °-'^ 4RlM^`	 '^`,^Xf^R'^'^";i^4:^v'^"t^^F;°^° 
S'% '±r,^',.
 
M
?:o have been already terminated. "Negative! I replied", read one such
airman ' s narrative, "then I added, 'We're leaving 10,000 feet for Plight
Level two eight zero"'. The tacked -on, after-thought, "then, I added"
phrases on a congested frequency not only were frequently etovered over by
another call up but also smothered the initial phrases of the next
transmission on the apparently open frequency.
The insidious aural characteristic of the dangling transmission is
displayed in the dialogue below:
Air Carrier Pilot:
II XYZ is maintaining zero nine zero degrees ... as assigned".
Approach Controller:
"...turn to one eight zero degrees".
;.#	 Air Carrier Pilot:
"Roger, XYZ, turning to one eight zero".
Thirty seconds later:
Approach Controller:
"XYZ, where are you going!! You were giver. zero nine
zero. Turn immediately and climb ..."
Only much later, and only by exact recall of the communication sequence,
could the puzzled airman "work out how it all happened". He explained, "The
other aircraft's call sign aust have been cut off by my reply. H^wever, the
controller ' s immediate response made it sound to us that he was instructing
us to turn". Since reporters seldom submitted such innocuous and apparently
trivial details as pauses or hesitations in their transmissions, how fre-
quently "dangling", run-on phrases blocked other call sign messages could not
be determined.
Cockpit speaker usage. - In reverse of faulty microphone techniques, the
use of cockpit speakers for reception contributed a number of call sign prob-
lems. Three twin engine airmen reported that simultaneous dual reception or
simultaneous transmission /reception on separate VHF frequencies had "muted
out" ATC call up transmissions. Probabl y all pilots who have worked with
cockpit speakers have encount,red the clogged cacophony of sounds when out-
5
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puts of two radios are fed through them. The rueful comments of the twin
engine airmen reflected such experiences: "If we had used our headmets, we
could have heard ATC ... ", "There was considerable confusion in the cockpit
with Center instructions coming in on one speaker and the ATIS on the other."
"The clearance to descend in the holding pattern had been for a similar
flight number (103 versus 503). Our aircraft has a speaker system: the F/O
was talking to the company on one radio and the first numbers in the call
sign had been partially muted by the speakers...".
The deliberately over-abbreviated call sign. - Whether bending to urgent
time/workload pressures during busy, chaotic conditions or apparently lulled
by dull repetition into nonchalant brevity, both controllers and airmen
either self-admitted or were reported to have intentionally short cut air-
craft call signs during call ups and in acknowledgements.
The practice appeared so prevalent in the system that the majority of
reporters framed their individual experiences into sweeping "everyone-does-
it" generalizations. "Pilots on this line are lax in dropping their company
prefixes...", "A very large percentage of pilots do not use their call signs
when changing frequencies: they say 'Bye' or 'Roger'...", "We find several
FAA facilities to be very lax in using only airline trip numbers without the
company prefix names...", "Dropping the prefix of aircraft types is common
during busy, chaotic conditions...", "The simple truth is that only five per-
cent of ART_CC controllers ever use the aircraft type when calling General
Aviation aircraft...."
However general the comments, all reports focused upon one single con-
cern: the unauthorized over abbreviations permitted two entirely different
aircraft identifications to assume a similarity of sound or of letters or of
numbers that could easily be "read" as a transmission to the wrong aircraft.
At best, the results could be confusion, additional workload and con-
cern:
"Roth Rizjets were using only the last 2 digits of their
call signs when acknowledging various altitude assign-
s a result, '12SK' and '13AK' caused great con-
6
fusion and required many additional instructions to keep
them apart."
"I was WRSXS in the pattern for 31R. A SUS65, with a
different manufacturer prefix, was an itinerant arrival,
also to 31R.
"Since the controller did not use the manufacturers' pre-
fixes, we had 'SX5' and 'S65' both on the frequency.
There was confusion -- 'Wac that for us?' type of thing.
"It seems that the new controllers are not being trained
to recognize the similar call sign problem."
At worst, the prefix dropping practice could precipitate near disasters:
"The problem arose because I did not state the aircraft
type when I issued a descent clearance to 'Ore Two Char-
ley'. 'Two One Charley was also on the frequency and
also accepted the clearance. However, I did not no%ice
this until I observed his altitude readout at 14,500
feet. (Minimum enroute altitude in his sector, was
16,n00.)
"I verified his altitude and then issued him an immediate
climb. I asked him for his flight conditions and he said
he was in IFR.
"There is no doubt in my mind that within another minute
or two, Two One Charley would have crashed in the moun-
tains."
In an unusual reverse application, an ATC facility apparently "skipped"
its identification in a continuing dialogue with an air carrier flight crew.
The confused First Officer communicator, who "figured it out later", stated
that his quotes of ATC transm!ssions were verbatim:
"I, the First Officer, called, 'XYZ Center, Air Carrier
ARC is with you, descending to FL240'. The controller's
reply was, 'ARC, continue descent to one two thousand,
altimeter setting 29.94'.
"Since we had just copied the ATIS with an altimeter set-
ting of 29.84, I questioned the altimeter. Center came
back with, 'No, ABC, altimeter is 24.94'.
"There was considerable discussion in the cockpit about
the altimeter differences. Finally, the Captain told the
S/0 to check with the Company. This was given as 29.81.
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"Despite repeated calls, we could not ctnta.ct the Center
again. We switched over to Approach Control, advising
them that we were descending to one two thousand.
"The approach controller sal;.',. 'There must be a mistake
somewM re'. We had not been issued any clearance to
leave PL240.
"This is what I believe happenef l . The controller gave us
the wrong frequency -- or else I copied it wrong -- and I
contacted GGG Center instead of XY2 Center. Enroute, we
had heard another air carrier behind us, going into GGG.
"I belie ve GGG Center issued us a descent clearance for
the other aircraft and failure to use his ID in answering
our call led to the incident."
Call Sign Errors, Related to Frequency
Congestion; or, "Was That For Us?"
"Pilots ... must be certain that aircraft identification is
camplete and clearly identified before taking any action
can an ATC clearance." (AIM, 193b.)
"Precede all readbacks and acknowledgements with the air-
craft identification.... The requirement becomes more
important as frequency congestion increases..."'
(AIM, 265(b)(1).)
Errors related to frequency congestion fall into 3 categories:
• Dilemmas of uncertainty and expectation
• Clearance amendment problems
• ?Nonstop ATC transmissions
Dilemmas o: uncertainty and expectation. - "We heard a call, clearing
someone...", "The call sign was garbled...", "The flight call sign was
obscured...", "The company prefix was garbled...", "The f ront end of the
transmission was smeared...": frequency congestion, specifically the overlap
of aircraft call signs, abruptly injected a painful dilemma into cockpit
decision making. The horns were sharpened considerably if "expedite" or
"immediate" had been included in the message contents.
8
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iThe pilot uncertainty -- whether to act or not to iict -- surfaced in
some narratives:
"I asked the Captain if 'that was for us?' and he said
'he thought so..."'
* * * e
"Ply Captain understood the message to be for us. I was
not sure..."
In the majority of incidents, the airmen elected to assume that the
smeared call sign message had been intended for their aircraft. This
predisposition •aas puzzling until analysis of the individual narratives indi-
cated a tie-in with the level of cockpit expectancy for a forthcoming clear-
ance. Being momentarily held at an intermediate altitude, awaiting an ATC
response to a previous request "for higher", in "position and hold" while
standing by for takeoff clearance, approaching normal top-Gf-descent, dis-
tance out points -- these airspace/airport situations supported pilot suppo-
sition that "it must have been for us".
The other horn in the act or not to act dilemma was equally pointed.
"Waiting to see" if the smeared transmission would be repeated did not avoid
subsequent altitude-deviations and/or midair traffic conflicts.
"Initially, we had been cleared to climb to FL310. Once
we heard a 'maintain FL250' but the call sign was garbled
and so we did not acknowledge it. As we passed through
FL265, Center called and asked if we had received our
amended clearance to maintain F1,250...".
The cockpit decisions not to comply with instructions following a
smeared call sign transmission also appeared to conform with the airmen's
expectancy levels. Many of the ignored call up messages were associated with
the issuance of a prior clearance followed by an amended ATC assigned alti-
tude. Having just been issued a clearance to a higher or lower altitude,
immediate change in instructions would not normally be anticipated. Thus,
any garbled call sign transmissions would be disregarded by the airmen as
"probably not for us".
9
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"If doubt exists concerning proper identity", states the AIM, "pilots
should use the phrase 'verify clearance'... :` Such a query would resolve the
"Was that for us?" uncertainty. However, the same voice clutter on the fre-
quency that initiated the call sign ambiguity also frequently prevented
timely confirmat ion of the call up.
"We could not get through to confirm the call..."
"I wanted to reconfirm the clearance but could not get
through."
"We could not get through ... so we initiated a climb."
Clearance amendment problems. - Frequency congestion was often reported
as an associated element in airmen's misses of ATC call ups prefacing amended
clearance instructions. Seventeen percent of all call sign incidents
involved airmen ' s failures zo respond to and comply with revised restric-
tions. The tenor of numerous controller reports indicated that pilots
apparently tended to diminish listening attention once an expected clearance
had been received. The airman protests were vehement: the amended instruc-
tions never had been received in the cockpit; no acknowledgement had been
transmitted; why had not the controller caught the absence of the
acknowledgement?
While some controller reports referenced workload and traffic volume as
justifications for missed readbacks or acknowledgements, a surprising number
of submissions merely noted thQ omission. "Later, I found out the pilot had
never acknowledged for the clearance...", "The pilot never acknowledged the
clearance and I didn ' t catch it...", "I cleared the small transport from
5000 to 4000 but I failed to notice that he did not acknowledge...".
Overall, in this category of events, the absence of explanatory details sug-
gested that the omissions of pilot acknowledgements were not considered as
primary factors in the incident happenings.
10
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The in-flight incidents of unacknowledged amended clearances were paral-
leled in taxi operations. The majority of these occurrences involved initial
clearance to taxi to the runway with subsequent instructions during the taxi-
ing to "hold short" of an intersecting or parallel runway. The compound
failure in communications -- the airmen missed the call up, did not ack-
nowledge the message and the controller failure to note the omission --
resulted in unauthorized crossing or entry into an active runway.
The airman explanations were firmly stated: no "hold short" reclearance
messages had been heard and no acknowledgements for such instructions had
been transmitted.
"The tower said that they had told us to hold short: I
missed that transmission..."
"We never received or acknowledged for any clearance to
hold short..."
"After crossing, the tower asked if we had heard his
'hold short' clearance. We replied we had not."
"The tapes confirmed that they hal told us to hold
short..."
"If a clearance to hold short had been issued, it must
have been blocked by other transmissions."
In this set of runway incursion reports, airmen identified two cir-
cumstantial factors pertinent tc the missed ATC instructions. "Congestion on
the frequency" frequently was cited: "With so much tower conversation going
on, it is nearly impossible to hear all ATC transmissions". "Heavy radio
communications" induced airman postincident speculations that the "hold
short" message may have been blocked out during simultaneous transmissions.
11
VCockpit workload tasks also were mentioned in the narratives. Several
air carrier flight crews specifically noted engine start-ups during taxi out
as major distractions to radio attentiveness.
Several airmen suggested a procedural "fix" for "hold short" incidents
involving communication failures:
1) Initial clearances to taxi should not state "to the run-
way" but only to the "hold short" position on the air-
port.
2) All pilots should be required to read back any "hold
short" instructions. Controllers should listen to verify
that such instructions have been received.
3) Only after such communication exchanges should an air-
craft that could conflict with a crossing aircraft be
released for takeoff.
Nonstop ATC transmissions. - "We pilots are triggered by our aircraft
call numbers...". In this and in similarly phrased comments, airmen protested
the insertion of multiple aircraft messages within a single, nonstop ATC
transmission.
f
	
	 The "trigger" metaphor is an apt reference to a well-known self-
disciplining process in psychologically conditioning airmen. All experienced
pilots are familiar with it, develop it, and use it. Except for momentary
spurts of attention -- to checklists, traffic watch, engine instruments --
pilots in manual flight direct their attentiveness to flying and "keeping
ahead" of their aircraft. A full-time listening watch to continuous ATC
voice traffic cannot be sustained. As a protective shield from communica-
tions distractions, pilots develop an aural shut-off, an on-off attentiveness
that cycles with each new ATC transmission and is keyed open by the
particular call sign of their aircraft. When an ATC transmission is ini-
tiated with another aircraft's call sign, the on-demand flow of attention is
not activated. It will normally stay off until a subsequent ATC transmission
is transmitted.
Run-on ATC messages -- instructions to one aircraft continuing without a
break in transmission into multiple instructions to numerous other aircraft
12
-- evoked a series of pilot protest reports to the ASRS. "The controller
issued instructions to 12 different aircraft, all in one, nonstop
transmission...". "The controller was so busy that he had to talk continu-
ously for up to 45 seconds a time...". 	 j
The nonstop transmissions were during rush hour, under big city terminal
characteristics. The majority of pilot reports recognized the realities of
congested traffic conditions with controllers directing aircraft mentioned
specifically as 18, 20, and 22 in number. Compliments to the controllers for
doing a good job under difficult circumstances were expressed frequently.
However, the complimentary phrases invariably continued into the contradic-
tory conjunction "but". "... BUT there was no opportunity for any pilot to
acknowledge..." "... BUT (if) in the same message, (he) issues instructions
to other aircraft, call signs may be missed,""... BUT controllers should
not combine messages to different aircraft...".
Pilots were concerned with two gaps in this kind of cockpit/controller
exchange of information: (1) the airman might miss his call up and, with it,
his instructions and, (2) without the opportunity to acknowledge as
prescribed in AIM* , the controller would not know of any missed call up
instructions.
Addressee Problems With Similar Sounding
Aircraft Call Signs
"Aircraft call signs (may) have similar numbers/sounds or
identical letters/numbers."
"Do not abbreviate similar sounding aircraft identifica-
tions..." (7110.65, Par 76).
"Emphasize appropriate digits, letters or similar sound-
ing words to aid in distinguishing between similar sound-
ing aircraft identifications. Additionally, (a) Notify
each pilot concerned when communicating with aircraft
having similar sounding identifications." Example. --
*AIM, 265: "Pilots of airborne aircraft should readback those parts of ATC
clearances and instructions containing altitude assignments or vectors, as a
means of mutual verification."
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Inited 31, United, ... Eastern 31 is also on this fre-
Lency..." (7110.65, Par 83).
"There was confusion as to who was who, with company Air
Carrier 'A' and company Air Carrier 'B' both on the
visual approach."
"After we dived to avoid a posc'ble midair collision, we
asked the controller for an explanation. He then stated
that our clearance to climb had been for aircraft '245'
and not for us, '345'."
*
"It is a gross error on someone's part to allow call
signs that are almost identical -- in this case, 'Baker
4' and 'Air Baker 44'."*
* * *
"Before we hurt someone, this call sign problem has to be
resolved!"
When "Porgy 129" and "Great Porgy 128" were simultaneously on the fre-
quency -- or, AK31 with SY.13, or, XYZ123 with XYZ132, or, ABC851 with ARC852
-- then the human factor errors mentioned in the Controller Handbook indeed
"struck swiftly" and frequently during ATC/pilot communication exchanges.
Two hundred fifty incidents of similar aircraft call sign confusions
were submitted to the ASRS during the approximate 4-year period. Similari-
ties -- of sounds, of names, of letters and of numbers -- tricked the ears,
the tongues, and the minds of both airmen and controllers. Nor were these
instances of one-time happenstances of untimely coincidence: the majority of
reports cited the similar call sign problems as chronic conditions imposed
upon the ATC system through fixed, same-time schedules, hub traffic flow and
main base terminal activities. Furthermore, controller reports cautioned
that similar call signs were proliferating, as regional air carriers and air
taxi services continued to displace wide-bodied aircraft with smaller tran-
sports flying multiple trips over confined, inter-city route pairs.
All ASRS reports are completely deidentified. Similar aircraft call sign
identifications in these quotations are representative only and have no rela-
tionship with any names or designators in actual use.
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The numbers of incidents associated with similar aircraft identifica-
tions reflected, also, the dual vulnerability of pilots and controllers.
Many types of mistakes can be made only by an airman in operation of his air-
craft. Other inaccuracies are controller-only commissions or omissions.
However, the aircraft call sign communication link could be broken at either
end of the exchange: by the airman in misperception of his call up or by the
controller, in transmission of a wrong call sign, call up of the wrong air-
craft, etc.
The slip-ups in the transmission and/or acknowledgement of similar air-
craft call signs fell into three separate sets of ambiguities.
• Similar sounding prefix names combined with similar or
identical trip numbers/letters (e.g., "Baker 4" with "Air
Baker 44").
• Identical airline, company, air taxi, or manufacturer
prefixes combined with similar sounding or similar
numbers/letters in trip or registration designators.
• Same, but differently ordered, digits in trip numbers or
registration numbers/letters. This call sign similarity
is intensified if (a) designator prefixes are dropped or
(b) identical prefixes (manufacturer or company names)
are present.
According to ASPS reports the error chains stimulated by these different
manifestations of the similarity problem are somewhat different.
Similar prefix, similar alpha-numerics. - Many of the similar prefix
incidents appeared to stem from a corporate "me-too" selection of designa-
tors, a subliminal marketing device that projected images of route service
areas to prospective passengers.
As a Lraditional practice, air carriers always have tended to adopt
those corporate names that visually and aurally delineated the geographical
regions served by their schedules. The route-origin roots are still intact
in such names as Eastern, Western, Alaska, Pan American, Hawaii, Northwest
and similar geographic-oriented designators.
r.
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With the majority of U.S. geographical regions pre-empted by designators
used by the established carriers, later entrants into Part 121 or 135 opera-
tions bridged scheduled service areas into corporate names by affixing a pre-
fix or suffix to an airline designator already in use. Modifiers such as
j	 "North", "Air", "Royal", "South", "Express", etc., achieved this goal.
The mix of semi-identical prefixes inserted a set of extremely ambiguous
call signs into the ATC communication network. A slurred initial
transmission, a partially blocked call up, an abbreviated acknowledgement --
the sluff-over of but a syllable could misdirect an ATC clearance. "There
have been many instances," stated one regional air carrier airman, "where the
first word of our call sign has been clipped off se that it sounded like
another carrier operating in this area". In other incidents the added-on
prefix was duplicated in the call signs: 'bur airline name is 'BCD Air',
read another report, "and ' BCD Air' and 'CBD Air' sound similar. In this
case, I believe the controller must have been talking to 'CBD Air'. Further-
more, controller transmissions at this airport are very rapid staccato..."
If the trip numbers of two aircraft using similar prefix designators
were identical, then the potential for error was compounded. In the incident
below, one such flight was taxiing in, after landing, while the second trip
was taxiing out for takeoff.
"We were 'Archer' flight 678 and after we heard 'Great
Archer 678' also on the frequency, we all discussed in
the cockpit the possibilities that might occur.
"Then we thought we heard Ground Control clear us across
the active, to expedite crossing. We thought the air-
craft on final looked close in, so we hurried.
"Half way across the runway, Ground Control told us that
the clearance had not been for us but...".
Identical prefixes, similar alpha-numerics. - In the second category of
similar aircraft call signs, the identifier prefixes were identical. Where
this was true with regard to airlines, the incidents usually developed from
the industry-wide practice of designating opposite direction flights between
city pairs with odd-even trip numbers. However, these north -south, east-west
directional indicators consisted of a single digit variation in the basic
16
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	 series of numbers used to identify operational route are .s (e.g., 60/61,
123/124, 811/812, etc.).
'r
Airmen and controllers who became entangled in these one-digit differ-
ences in call signs vigorously protested the odd-even numbering system: "A
dramatic effort should be made by every airline to avoid assigning similar
digit numbers to trips arriving/departing major terminals...", "Airlines
should eliminate similar call signs from aircraft arriving and departing an
airport at the same time...", "We shouldn't permit similar flight numbered
company trips to arrive at the same time...", "This call sign problem has to
be resolved!"
The similar trip numbers produced similar incident patterns. Both trunk
and regional air carriers were vulnerable:
"XYZ123 was cleared to climb to 16,000 feet. Climbing
through 5500, the departure controlier called and asked,
'Where are you going?'.
"Company XZY126 was also on the frequency so maybe we
took his clearance."
"ATC issued us an immediate turn. Then the controller
told us that the descent clearance had been for our com-
pany flight..."
"Every morning, this local airline has flights 123, 124,
and 125 all operating at the same time. This a.m. I
issued a climb clearance to 123 and the pilot of 124 took
the clearance by mistake. From the tapes, it appears
that 123 and 125 came within 100 feet of each other."
Controller reports displayed considerable umbrage and frustration at
airmen who apparently forgot their own aircraft call signs.
"Air Carrier ABC123 and ABC124 both arrive at this air-
port at the same time and on the same frequency. They
should try to remember their trip numbers!!"
17
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"This is a recurring problem at this airport. Commuter
airline XYZ regularly adds on extra section flights, all
using the same basic trip number. Example: 801, 801A,
801B, 801C, etc.
"The flights all end up in trail, all on the same fre-
quency. The pilots take clearances for the wrong air-
craft, they forget if they are operating 'A' or 'B' or
'C' or the basic fli;':t....
"The situation is not only confusing but has potential
for a real problem!"
The airmen's narratives permitted some empathetic understanding of their
misplaced call sign ide£itify. In short haul operations, pilots frequently
operated several odd/even numbered trips during a one-day schedule pattern.
In longer trip cycles, the airmen operated a repetitive series of back-and-
i forth round trips within a bid block of time. Habit-conditioned, in outbound
flight to one call sign, the .flight crews admittedly forgot, at times, after
turn-around, that they were operating a similar but different trip number in
the opposite direction. In one incident report, a pilot confounded a series
of ATC controllers by filing his flight plan, taxiing and taking off, still
using the inbound trip number of the previous flight.
The identical-prefix-simi.lar-trip-number airline call signs were paral-
leled in various air taxi and General Aviation operations. These two activi-
ties tended to cluster at individual airports, the air taxis with multiple,
consecutively numbered aircraft call signs and light planes, with the same
manufacturer prefix, doing repetitive takeoff and landing practice in the
pattern.
"I was 123Y.ilo but the Ground Controller apparently mixed
me up with 124Kilo taxiing out behind me. It became very
confusing..."
"There is a flight school on this airport. We have a
problem that is both ludicrous and unsafe when 3 or 4
low-time pilots, all with the school's similar call sign
aircraft, are operating around the field."
18
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"The reason that I'm writing this is because it happened
to me twice in the same day. I was giving flight
Instruction in an XXX type trainer with an aircraft with
the same manufacturer name also in the pattern. I was
able to keep things straightened out but I wonder how
students, alone in the plane, would make out in such con-
fusion of call signs."
s
Same digits, differently ordered. - The third category of aircraft call
sign similarity fostered transposition errors. Usually, these slips-of-the-
tongue consisted of misordering identical sets of digits. In appearance, the
call sign "ABC581" may not be similar to a call sign such as "ABC851"; yet,
in repetitive incidents, controllers and airmen confused such numerical
sequences during communication exchanges.
"The center apparently intended to tell XYZ4123 to main-
tain one three thousand. Instead, he got us confused
with them (XYZ123) and issued it to us."
"We heard the Center calling ADC143 four times. We did
not answer these calls. Later, I came to believe that
she had been trying to -each us (we were ABC123)."
"When aircraft C suddenly called in on the frequency. the
controller trainee became flustered. This resulted in
his calling C by another name in several call ups. C did
not acknowledge these calls.
"A and C were on collision courses until A pilot saw the
traffic and took evasive action."
Hurried, "panicky" transmissions were particularly vulnerable to
transposed call sign errors. Controller training appeared as a background
causal factor in some incidents; in others, hasty messages during emergency
situations were misdirected to the wrong aircraft.
"The computer locked up and seized in position. For one
minute and twenty seconds there was no computer or DARC
display. No data blocks moved.
"When the radar display resumed, I saw 2 air carriers,
head-to-head, opposite direction, same altitude.
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E"I issued an immediate descent clearance but in my
excitement I transposed call signs and issued the clear-
ance to a third aircraft on the frequency.
"The 2 air carriers passed each other, both level at
FL2R0."
"I was setting max takeoff power when I heard a garbled
transmission referring to 'Air Carrier XXX' (our call
sign). Shortly thereafter, I clearly heard a call, 'XXX,
your right engine is on fire!!'
"I immediately aborted the takeoff..."
"The trainee arrival controller saw the conflict develop-
ing and issued a heading change. However, he used the
wrong call sign and the Navy jet ignored the turn
instructions. At this time, the 2 aircraft were rapidly
closing ... the instructor controller told the military
trainer to climb l and then repeated the transmission.
The pilot applied full power, commenced a zoom climb and,
on breaking out of IMC, saw the light twin as it passedby."
Airman Acknowledgement/Readback Errors; or,
Is Anyone Listening IJR There?
"(Airmen,) should acknowledge all call ups and clear -
ances..." (AIM, Chapter 192(c)).
Throughout the study, controller narratives expressed frustration,
chagrin, and, at times, outright dismay, at airmen's apparent inattentiveness
to ATC transmissions. Piio^s .nissed their aircraft call ups, took clearances
for other aircraft, frequenEly failed to respond and comply with clearance
amendments and, in general, were "tuned out" when busy, congested traffic
conditions clogged the frequencies.
1°I must have noticed that G .A. and most corporate pilots
need to be called two or three times before responding to
the first call up."
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a"Time is very important to a controller. I suggest that
pilots be required to maintain a better listening watch
on the frequency."
"The Center advised, 'We would appreciate your listening
more to your clearances.' We rogered and apologized..."
"The breakdown in communication came from the age old
problem of not listening. Had the pilot been paying
attention..."
The pilot communication failures were frequent enough to elicit various
controller "So what else is new?' resigned responses to apparent airman inat-
tentiveness. "It happens so frequently, it becomes commonplace...", "Flight
crews are not paying enough attention...", "Cause of incident? Pilot
apparently not listening...", "Another listening lesson...", "If pilots paid
more attention, they would not err so frequently...", "I called four times in
the space of one minute, without response...".
Numerous conflict incidents apparently substantiated controller Liafavor-
able comments concerning pilot monitoring of ATC communications:
"At this time, aircraft ABC was cleared to FL350 so as to
pass above aircraft XYZ. However, CRC took ABC's clear-
ance and started climb. After about a minute, ABC was
observed on radar still at his previous altitude and was
given a turn to avoid XYZ. Three or four calls were
required to get his attention...
"Then the altitude readout of CBC was observed. He con-
firmed he was climbing and then ABC reported that he was
taking evasive action to miss an airerat ahead of him at
the same altitude..:
"The incident was caused by the pilot's not listening
carefully enough..."
21
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rError InvolvinA Controller Confirmations
_	 of-Acknowledgements Readbaeks; or.
To Anyone Listening Down There?
"The readback...serves as a double check between pilots
and controllers and reduces the kinds of communication
errors that occur when a number is either 'misheard' or
is incorrect." (AIM, Chapter 265)
"If we are required to make readbacks, it would seem that
it should he a controller's responsibility to listen to
them."
"My point is this: what is the value of readbacks if no
one on the other end is listening?"
"Either due to workload or surroundings, the controllers
do not seem to hear aircraft replies..."
The most obvious, the most repetitive, and perhaps the most significant
deficiency identified in the reported call sign incidents was the failure of
a controller to listen to a pilot's acknowledgement or readback of an ATC
clearance message.
The problem seemed endemic: in the reported picture, controllers were
not listening.
The airmen were puzzled by it: why their responses apparently were
ignored, why their communication mistakes passed unchallenged through a sup-
posedly fail-safe verification process. Forty-two percent of the reported
incidents of pilot errors in call sign acknowledgements specifically noted
that controllers had failed to catch the cockpit mistakes. Pilots expressed
their bewilderment at the failure of the double-check system in direct terms:
"Someone is not listening...", "Somebody is not listening...", "Why the con-
troller did not correct us on our reaahack is unknown...", "I suggest that
controllers listen to flight crews to verify...", "The controller made no
correction to my readback...", "Sometimes you don't eves; get a mike click to
verify an acknowledgement...", etc., etc.
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"For some reasor I did not catch...", "I failed to hear...", "I did not pay
attention to...", "The controller did not realize the wrong aircraft had
acknowledged...", "}or whatever reason, I did not hear...", "Due to another
aircraft on a missed approach, I did not hear...". The type of facility, the
workload conditions and the distraction elements varied extensively, but the
"I did not hear" phraseology remained a constant in the reports. Other con-
troller reporters were more ambivalent in their self-assessments of blame for
incidents resulting from an airman's error in call sign response. There was
considerable emphasis on pilot responsibility: "If the pilots paid more
attention, they would not err so frequently". Similarly themed observations
implied that the verification role in readback confirmations was merely a
secondary procedural step. The irony in the situation was obvious to them:
their mistakes consisted of failures to catch and correct airmen's errors.
"I'm the one stuck with the job of correcting other people's mistakes",
lamented one controller, "If I don't hear it, then I'm the one who gets the
blame!"
The controllers' cause-and-effect logic was valid: in the ASRS reports,
their monitoring failures were not the primary causal agents for the hazar-
dous occurrences. The enabling errors were elsewhere: in airmen's misper-
ceptions, in "guessed at" aircraft identifications, in mental slip-ups and in
half-blocked transmissions. Yet, the missed verifications of pilot
acknowledgements and readbacks appeared to represent more than just:.;-other,
different set of human factor inconsistencies and limitations. From any pro-
cedural viewpoint, and certainly in the view of the airmen, the unmade con-
firmations constituted a breakdown of a basic system concept. The failure of
the procedural mechanism not o-.ly represented a second error, but the silent
acquiescence conveyed a false sense of security to the airmen that someone
t:.tt listened and someone had verified their responses ac correct.
The majority of controller narratives did not elaborate upon any causal
"why" or circumstantial "how" of missed confirmations of airman
acknowledgements/readbacks. This absence of explanatory detail may be due,
in some measure, to the type of error involved in the communication exchange:
errors of omission are not immediately obvious and are seldom selt-
23
w
recognized. Frequently, the double error was detected only in after -the-fact
running of the tapes in incident investigations. Overall, the controller
narratives portrayed their communication role as a short-spanned attentive-
ness to multiple aircraft: any deficiencies in listening to pilot responses
were enveloped in frequency congestion and in the rapid-fire pace of communi-
cations during heavy traffic conditions. The reports clearly indicated that
these conditions did not permit time for call up-pause, call up-pause, call
up-pause sequencing intervals in voice communications.
Analysis of these controller submitted reports led to an inference on
the part of the analysts that, perhaps subconsciously, controllers were
allowing radar moitoring to replace readback confirmations in ATC/cockpit
communication exchanges -- especially during congested traffic conditions.
The majority of the reports confirmed that pilot communication errors --
whether consisting of unheard ATC transmissions or misread call sign
responses -- were caught by radar observations of unauthorized deviations
from clearance instructions. This seeming reliance on radar surveillance as
the double-check mechanism in communications resulted in the pilot errors
being intercepted, but only after the erroneous actions had been initiated so
the aircraft was already out of the intended flight path.
Also, this apparent utilization of radar monitoring as sole confirmation
of complete and correct communication opened the door for coincidental event
chains not directly related to the communication failure to interact detri-
mentally. A radar computer failure, a tag drop, an aircraft transponder not
turned on or intermittent in operation, misread instructions that included
frequency changes and attention directed elsewhere on the radar scope -- such
system and 'human factor elements became causal agents for operational
anomalies rooted in communication failures. Eight percent of the call sign
incidents reflected inadequacies in radar surveillance when utilized as the
confirmation step in ATC/pilot communications.
furthermore, pilot expectation that ATC/cockpit communication exchanges
will normally consist of three to/from links is not supported by current FAR,
AIM, or controller handbook regulations. All of these authoritative guides
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indicate that heavy traffic conditions and congested voice frequenc:
been recognized as having the power to disable the three-step procedui
1) There is no FAR regulation or specified procedure that
requires pilot acknowledgement of clearances or instruc-
tions. There is no controller responsibility to confirm
such pilot acknowledgements /readbacks.
2) The controller's Handbook lists no formal duties or
responsibilities for controllers to monitor pilot
acknowledgements/readbacks.
3) The AIM contains only oblique references to the responsi-
bilities of pilots and controllers; the phraseology sug-
gests rather than mandates that:
a) "Pilots should readback those parts of clearances
that contain altitude assignments or vectors..."
b) "...such readbacks serve as a double check ... and
reduce errors..."
Perhaps the responsibilities of monitoring and confirmation of transmissions
as correct are assumed duties, too obvious for statement in official publica-
tions. However, the absence of specific responsibilities, the nonuse of
imperatives such as "must" or "shall", tends to indicate that readback con-
firmation is a best-effort option rather than a fixed, inflexible duty
requirement.
SUMMARY
Communication errors involving aircraft call signs were portrayed in
reports of 462 hazardous incidents voluntarily submitted to the ASRS during
an approximate 4-year period. These reports described occurrences wherein
ambiguities, misperceptions, and missed call lip transmissions or
acknowledgements resulted in confusion, disorder, and uncoordinated traffic
conditions. Specific operational results were altitude deviations, wrong-way
headings, aborted takeoffs, go arounds, runway incursions, missed crossing
altitude restrictions, descents toward high terrain, and a melange of near-
collision traffic conflicts in flight and on the ground.
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Analysis of the report set resulted in identification of five categories
or errors involving call signs: 1) faulty radio usage techniques, 2) call
sign loss or smearing due to frequency congestion, 3) confusion resulting
from similar sounding call signs, 4) airmen misses of call signs leading to
failures to acknowledge or readback, and 5) controller failures regarding
confirmation of acknowledgeraats or readbacks.
Perhaps the most significant of the study findings concerned the double
error sequencies in the last of these five categories: the incidents in
which an airman acknowledged and complied with ATC instructions intended for
another aircraft, followed by controller failure or delay in detecting the
misperception. The errors of commission and omission are equally culpable in
the normal routine of ATC/cockpit co- —n ications. However, the deeper
insight obtained from the study regarding the airmen's apparent belief in the
fidelity and reliability of the three--step communication protocol versus the
controller's apparently less rigorous practice of it (including the possibil-
ity of his substitution, on occasion, of radar monitoring) led to these con-
clusions regarding ATC/cockpit communication procedures.
• During busy, congested frequency conditions, airmen
should consider controller confirmation of their
acknowledgements/readbacks as a "best effort" action
rather than a procedural requirement in communications.
• An airman should not assume that routine readback of a
"doubtful" clearance or instruction is adequate for
verification purposes. A separate "verify..." transmis-
sion questioning the uncertain elements in the message
always should be made.
Misperceptions of similar aircraft call signs comprised slightly more
than half of the call sign incidents retrieved. Although procedures for
mitigating this hazard are set forth in various chapters of the AIM and the
Air Traffic Control handbook, both airmen and controllers demonstrated human
factor vulnerability to error in the presence of similarities in sounds,
letters, numbers and digits in aircraft designators. 77ie reporter submis-
sions seldom noted the issuance of an ATC advisory message stating that simi-
lar aircraft call signs were on the frequency. Those reports that mentioned
receipt or transmission of an advisory notice indicated that the similarity
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consisted of identical trip numbers. The controller handbook also exempli-
fies the need for the advisory with identical flight designators: thus,
"American thirty-one, Eastern thirty--one also is on the frequency...". This
narrow illustration of similarity may be a limiting factor in controller
recognition of other, less obvious combinations of phonetic similarities.
The hazard would be greatly reduced if:
• Airlines did not utilize an odd/even numbering system for
opposite direction flights when such trips are scheduled
for simultaneous or near-simultaneous arrivals/departures
at individual terminals.
• Extra section airline or air taxi flights were not tagged
with the same trip numbers when operating in the same
time periods.
• New airlines that have formed corporate designators by
addition of a prefix or suffix to names of established
airlines already operating in the same geographic route
areas (e.g., "Air", "Great", etc.) would adopt a dif-
ferent call sign for communication purposes (e.g., Pan
American utilizes a "Clipper" prefix, thus avoiding simi-
larity with American Airlines).
• Airmen and controllers, were to avoid the practice of
dropping prefixes in aircraft designators thus reducing
the number of dissimilar characteristics in call sign
transmissions and thereby increasing the potential for
similarity in trip or registration letters/numbers.
Seventeen percent (78 incidents) of the call sign message failures con-
sisted of apparently unheard and unacknowledged amendments to previous ATC
clearance instructions. The majority of in-flight occurrences represented
missed "Maintain of to previously issued clearances to
climb/descend to higher/lower altitudes. The on—the—ground, taxiing events
were related to "hold short" messages issued subsequent to the initial clear-
ance to the runway. The airmen failures to hear these ATC amendments fre
-
quently appeared to demonstrate displacement of listening attention by higher
priority duties. Additionally, the overlapping mix of high/low priorities
was interwoven with an apparent low level of cockpit expectancy for any
amendments to previous, acknowledged—for clearances. This hazard would be
reduced if :
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• Controllers were to be especially alert for "hear back"
of airman acknowledgements of amended clearance instruc-
tions.
• Consideration were given to requiring acknowledgements
and confirmations of acknowledgements for "hold short"
instructions during taxiing. This particularly applies
to multiple runway operations.
Frequency congestion was a factor in call sign communication problems
through the entire range of incident occurrences. Simultaneous transmissions
obliterated aircraft call signs, induced misperceptions, blocked transmis-
sions and acknowledgements and contributed to call sign similarities during
all phases of flight operations. The most effective means of mitigating this
complex hazard appears to be the introduction of data link technology which
is scheduled as part of the current "National Airspace Plan". Pending such
introduction, control of the hazard will depend mainly on the further
development of skill and devotion in adhering to sound procedures on the part
of all participants in aviation communications exchanges,
Throughout the set of call sign reports, one repetitive phrase charac-
terized both controller and airmen narratives. This typical expression could
be generally stated as: "I figured it out later, how it all must have hap-
pened..." The inability to comprehend immediately what was happening — or
why it was happening — epitomized the hazardous nature of call sign errors
in ATC/cockpit communications. If not immediately caught and corrected, call
sign mismatches often plunged the airman into confusion and the aircraft into
hazard. As the AIM warns, the communication link between pilot and con-
troller, once broken, may result in disastrous consequences.
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